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ABSTRACT. We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are
faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. New buyers arrive on the market probabilisti-
cally, and are each endowed with a constant private value. Moreover, objects also arrive on
the market at random times, so the number of competitors and the degree of informational
asymmetry among them may vary across from one auction to the next. We demonstrate
by way of a simple example the inefficiency of the second-price sealed-bid auction in this
setting, and therefore assume that each object is sold via ascending auction.
We then characterize an efficient and fully revealing periodic ex post incentive com-
patible equilibrium for the game in which the objects are sold via ascending auctions.
We show that each buyer’s bids and payoffs depend only upon their rank amongst their
competitors and the (revealed) values of those with lower values. Furthermore, strate-
gies are memoryless—bids depend only upon the information revealed in the current auc-
tion, and not on any information that may have been revealed in earlier periods. We then
demonstrate that the sequential ascending auction serves as an indirect mechanism that is
equivalent—in our setting—to the dynamic marginal contribution mechanism introduced
by Bergemann and Välimäki (2007) and generalized in Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2007).
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21. INTRODUCTION
Many markets, most notably internet markets such as eBay, sell multiple objects via
sequential auctions in which a single object is sold at a time. In this paper, we examine a
model of such markets in which new buyers arrive on the market at random times. Each
bidder has an independently drawn private value for purchasing an object. In contrast
to much of the literature that makes use of sealed-bid auctions, we focus on the ascend-
ing auction. Although the various auction formats are in many respects equivalent in
a static private-values setting, this equivalence does not hold in a dynamic environment,
primarily due to the information revelation inherent in the ascending auction format. The
difference between the two formats is further exacerbated in the sequential auction setting
when we allow for dynamically changing populations of buyers. In particular, the entry
of a new buyer introduces an additional informational asymmetry. We show, however,
that this asymmetry may be easily resolved by employing ascending auctions. In equi-
librium, each buyer’s bids and payoffs depend only on the buyer’s rank amongst their
current competitors and the (revealed) values of those opponents with lower values. Fur-
thermore, these strategies have the remarkable property of being memoryless—in each
auction conducted, bids are independent of the information revealed in previous peri-
ods, despite the fact that all private information is revealed during every auction.
We feel that this model serves as a useful abstraction of online auction sites such as
eBay or uBid, especially when considering the extensive market on these sites for indi-
vidual units of brand-new homogenous goods. Typically, a variety of auctions for iden-
tical items are open simultaneously, but may be ordered by their closing time. Thus,
abstracting away from intra-auction dynamics, a sequential auction model yields a good
approximation.1 With this in mind, many authors (see Sailer (2006) or Zeithammer (2006),
for instance) make use of the second-price sealed-bid auction, citing evidence from Roth
and Ockenfels (2002) and Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) about the prevalence of “sniping”
(last-second bidding) in online auctions in defense of their modeling choice. However, as
shown by Cai, Wurman, and Chao (2007), pure-strategy symmetric equilibria do not exist
in sequential sealed-bid auctions when buyer values are fixed across time and bids are
made publicly observable after each auction. As most online auctions bear a close resem-
blance to English auctions in regards to intra-auction dynamics as well as the visibility
of submitted bids (both during an auction and after an auction has closed), we believe
that the ascending auction is better-suited than the sealed-bid second-price auction for
modeling online auction markets.2
1Nekipelov (2007) examines a different aspect of these markets, choosing to ignore the sequential nature of
these auctions in order to study within-auction dynamics.
2Either choice is, of course, a compromise, abstracting away important features of the real-world environ-
ment for the sake of tractability.
INFORMATION REVELATION AND RANDOM ENTRY IN SEQUENTIAL ASCENDING AUCTIONS 3
What is more, we feel that the sequential ascending auction is important for another,
independent, reason. Bergemann and Välimäki (2007) demonstrate the suitability of se-
quential ascending auctions as a simple way to provide for the truthful implementation
of the socially efficient allocation in a task scheduling problem. In particular, they pro-
vide an example in which sequential ascending auctions are equivalent to their dynamic
generalization of the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.3 Cavallo, Parkes, and
Singh (2007) generalize this mechanism to settings in which agents may be “inaccessible”
for periods of time. The present work complements these papers, as we show that the
sequential ascending auction serves as an (easily implemented and understood) indirect
mechanism that is equivalent to their direct mechanisms in a complex environment, and
is therefore an incentive compatible mechanism for inducing socially efficient choices.
The present work is closely related to several papers in the sequential auctions litera-
ture. Milgrom and Weber (2000) examine the properties of a variety of auction formats
for the (simultaneous or sequential) sale of multiple objects with a fixed set of buyers and
objects. In regards to the ascending auction with private values, they show that, in equi-
librium, buyers bid exactly their values. However, they allow for neither discounting nor
the entry of new buyers, features that play a central role our model. The vast majority
of the literature following that work has chosen to focus on sealed-bid auctions; for ex-
ample, the previously referenced Sailer (2006) and Zeithammer (2006) conduct empirical
studies of eBay auctions making use of sequential second-price sealed-bid auctions and
assumptions of an effectively static environment. Kittsteiner, Nikutta, and Winter (2004)
examine the role of discounting in sequential sealed-bid auctions, and prove a revenue
equivalence result for auctions in which the only information revealed is the valuations
of bidders who have already left the market, while Jeitschko (1998) considers a model of
first-price sealed-bid auctions in which winner’s bids are revealed, allowing the remain-
ing buyers to update their beliefs about their opponents’ valuations. On the other hand,
Cai, Wurman, and Chao (2007) demonstrate the nonexistence of pure-strategy symmet-
ric equilibria in sealed-bid sequential auction models in which all bids are revealed. The
only paper that we are aware of that examines sequential ascending auctions is that of
Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004), who examine reserve prices in a model with a sequence of
only two auctions.
Certain elements within the bargaining with incomplete information literature are also
related to our model. Inderst (2008) considers a bargaining model in which a seller is
randomly visited by heterogeneous buyers. If the seller is currently engaged in bargain-
ing with one agent when another arrives, she may choose to switch from one buyer to
the other. However, this switch is permanent, implying that the arrival of a new buyer
3Their example differs substantially from the present work, as it does not take into account the complica-
tions of random buyer and seller arrivals, and hence may be viewed as an essentially static problem.
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either “restarts” the game or is completely irrelevant. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2008) take
a different approach: they consider an incomplete information bargaining problem be-
tween a buyer and a seller, and allow for the possibility of the arrival of “events” which
end the game and yield a particular expected payoff to each agent. Their interpretation
is that these events may be viewed as triggers for some sort of multi-lateral mechanism
involving new entrants (a second-price auction, for example) for which the expected pay-
offs are a reduced-form representation. Thus, while both works are primarily concerned
with characterizing the endogenous option value that results from the potential arrival
of additional participants to the market, they do this in a framework of bilateral bargain-
ing which fails to capture the dynamic nature of competition among several current and
potential market participants. On the other hand, Nekipelov (2007) studies the role of en-
try during a single online ascending auction, while Said (2008) examines the role of buyer
entry between periods in a model of sequential second-price auctions in which objects are
stochastically equivalent. By way of comparison, the present work incorporates buyer
entry between ascending auctions in a more standard private values framework, and fur-
ther demonstrates the relationship between the endogenous option value arising from
participating in future auctions with the marginal contribution to social welfare.
Finally, we would be remiss in not noting the relationship between our model and that
of Peters and Severinov (2006). Also primarily motivated by auction markets such as
eBay, their work considers a setting with multiple buyers and sellers interacting simulta-
neously. They find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that supports efficient trade at Vickrey
prices; moreover, if the numbers of buyers and sellers are sufficiently large, then trade is
also ex post efficient. While their model has the advantage of considering the effects of
competing auctions on the strategic behavior of buyers and sellers, it does not take into
account what we believe are two key features of the markets in question (and the two key
features of our model): auctions are conducted asynchronously, and new agents arrive on
the market at random times.
The paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2, and then provide
a simple example demonstrating some of the advantages of the ascending auction format
over the second-price sealed-bid auction in a dynamic setting with buyer entry in Section
3. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium in our model with buyer entry and demonstrates
some of its desirable properties. In Section 5, we discuss the relationship between our
model and the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and generalize our setting to
allow for the random arrival of objects. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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2. THE MODEL
We consider a market in which time is discrete; periods are indexed by t ∈ N. There
is a finite number nt of risk-neutral buyers with single-unit demand in the market in
any given period t. Each buyer i ∈ {1, . . . , nt} has a valuation vi ∈ R+, where vi is
drawn from the distribution F with corresponding density f . We assume that valuations
are private information, and are independently and identically distributed across buyers.
Moreover, additional buyers may arrive on the market in each period. We will assume
that at most one new buyer arrives in any given period, and that this arrival occurs with
some exogenously given probability q ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, we assume that buyers discount
the future exponentially with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
In each period, there is exactly one object available for sale via an ascending (English)
auction. The auction begins with the price at zero and all bidders participating in the
auction. Each bidder may choose any price at which to drop out of the auction. This exit
decision is irreversible (in the current period), and is observable by all agents currently
present in the market. Finally, the auction ends whenever exactly 1 active bidder remains,
and the price paid by this winning bidder is the price at which the last exit occurred. Note
that we assume that the number of active bidders is commonly known throughout the
auction.4 With this in mind, each bidder’s decision problem within a given period is not
to choose a single bid, but rather a sequence of functions, each of which is a exit price
contingent on the (observed) exit prices of the bidders who have already dropped out of
the current auction.
Throughout, we will denote by vˆ the ordered vector of realized values for those buyers
currently present on the market, where
vˆ1 > vˆ2 > · · · > vˆnt .
Furthermore, for any k, n ∈ N such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we will denote by Vk,n(vˆ) the expected
payoff of the buyer with the k-th highest of n values. For example, if there are three
bidders present, with v2 > v3 > v1, then vˆ = {v2, v3, v1}, bidder 1’s payoff is V3,3(vˆ), bidder
2’s payoff is V1,3(vˆ), and bidder 3’s payoff is V2,3(vˆ).
3. A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Suppose that there are two buyers on the market with values v1, v2 ∈ [0, 1], where, with-
out loss of generality, we assume that v1 > v2. In addition, a third potential buyer with
value v3 ∼ F , where F is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] may enter the market with
probability q ∈ [0, 1]. Each of these buyers wishes to purchase exactly one unit of some
4This assumption is a consequence of the standard Milgrom and Weber (1982) “button auction” approach
to modeling English auctions.
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object which is being sold via a sequence of three auctions. All buyers discount time with
a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, we make the assumption that v1 and
v2 are commonly known amongst all buyers, which may be viewed as the result of infor-
mation being revealed via bidding behavior in some (unmodeled) previous periods. The
new entrant’s value, however, is her own private information. We will consider two vari-
ants of this example; first, we will assume that objects are sold via second-price auctions
in which the buyers’ bids are revealed after each round, and then we will assume that
objects are sold via ascending auctions.
We begin with the second-price auction. Note that in any round in which there is only
one bidder present, that bidder receives the object at a price of zero, regardless of her
bid. Therefore, if there are two bidders present in the second period, each bidder i has an
option value of δvi from losing. Thus, regardless of the information that each bidder has
about the other, it is weakly dominant for each bidder to submit a bid of their true value
less their option value—the optimal bid for each bidder i is (1− δ)vi. Thus, denoting the
payoff of a bidder in the second round when there are two bidders present as U(vi, vj),
we have
(3.1) U(vi, vj) =
vi − (1− δ)vj, if vi > vj;δvi, if vi ≤ vj.
Note that, using this expression, we may write the payoff of a lone bidder with value vi
as U(vi, 0).
Now consider the third bidder (when present). Under the assumption that bidder 1
bids a greater amount than bidder 2 (that is, that b1 > b2), the third bidder faces a choice
between winning the auction and receiving a payoff of v3 − b1 or losing the auction and
facing bidder 2 in the next period, yielding a payoff of δU(v3, v2). Thus, bidder 3 prefers
to win if, and only if, v3 − b1 ≥ δU(v3, v2), or, equivalently, b1 ≤ v3 − δU(v3, v2). She can
then win the auction if, and only if, it is optimal for her to do so by bidding
(3.2) b3(v3) = v3 − δU(v3, v2) =
(1− δ)v3 + δ(1− δ)v2, if v3 > v2;(1− δ2)v3, if v3 ≤ v2.
Note that b3 is strictly increasing in v3, and hence fully identifies bidder 3’s valuation in
the next period when bids are revealed. For convenience, we will denote by u1 and u2 the
values of bidder 3 that submit bids equal to those of bidders 1 and 2, respectively; that is,
u1 = b
−1
3 (b1) and u2 = b
−1
3 (b2).
Now consider the case of bidder 2’s bid in the first period of the game. If she submits
a winning bid in the first period, she receives a payoff of v2 − b∗, where b∗ is the highest
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competing bid that she faces. On the other hand, if she loses the first-round auction, she
receives a payoff of δE[U(v2, v∗)], where
v∗ =

0, with probability 1− q;
v3, with probability qF (u1);
v1, with probability q (1− F (u1)) .
Thus, bidder 2 prefers to win if, and only if, v2− b∗ ≥ δE[U(v2, v∗)]. She may then guaran-
tee that she wins only when it is desirable to do so by bidding
b2 = v2 − δE[U(v2, v∗)]
= v2 − δ
[
(1− q)v2 + δq (1− F (u1)) v2
+q
∫ v2
0
(v2 − (1− δ)v′) dF (v′) + q
∫ u1
v2
δv3 dF (v
′)
]
= (1− δ)(1 + δq)v2 − (1− δ)δq v
2
2
2
.(3.3)
Finally, let us consider buyer 1’s bidding behavior in the first period of the game. Note
first that u2 < v2 < v1, implying that if bidder 1 loses today, she will definitely win the
auction in the next period. To see this, note that if bidder 3 enters and wins the first round,
bidder 1 faces v2 < v1 in the next period. On the other hand, if bidder 2 is the high bidder
in the first round, then bidder 1 is either alone or faces v3 < u2 < v1 in the second round.
Thus, when the high opponent bid is b∗, winning yields bidder 1 a payoff of v1− b∗, while
losing yields a payoff of δU(v1, v∗), where
v∗ =

0, with probability 1− q;
v3, with probability qF (u2);
v2, with probability q (1− F (u2)) .
Thus, similar to the cases of bidders 2 and 3, bidder 1 may guarantee that she wins only
when it is desirable for her to do so by bidding
b1 = v1 − δE[U(v1, v∗)] = v1 − δ
[
(1− q)v1 + δq (1− F (u2)) (v1 − (1− δ)v2)
+q
∫ u2
0
(v1 − (1− δ)v′) dF (v′)
]
.
Recall that u2 = b−13 (b2) < v2, implying that u2 = b2/(1 − δ2). Combining this with the
assumption that F (x) = x implies that
u2 =
b2
1− δ2 =
1 + δq
1 + δ
v2 − δq
1 + δ
v22
2
.
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Thus, we may conclude that
b1 = (1− δ)v1 + (1− δ)δqv2
− δ(1− δ)(1 + δq)(1 + δ(2− q))qv
2
2
2(1 + δ)2
+
δ3(1− δ)(1− q)q2v32
2(1 + δ)2
+
δ3(1− δ)q3v42
8(1 + δ)2
.
(3.4)
For clarity, Figure 1 plots the bids of all three buyers for fixed parameter values.5 The
key features to note are that u1 < v1 and u2 < v2; use of the second-price auction in this
context may lead to inefficient outcomes, as “low” values of bidder 3 may outbid bidders
1 and 2 despite their having higher values. This result is driven by two main features
of our setting: first, agents discount the future and hence the order in which objects are
allocated matters; and second, there is a fundamental asymmetry in information—bidder
3’s value is private information, while the values of bidders 1 and 2 are commonly known.
Thus, in addition to the nonexistence of symmetric equilibria in sequential second-price
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
v3
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
b
b1
b2
b3Hv3L
v1v2
Figure 1: Initial bids when v1 = 23 , v2 =
1
3
, v3 ∼ U [0, 1], δ = 910 , and q = 14 .
sealed-bid auctions as demonstrated by Cai, Wurman, and Chao (2007), allowing for the
entry of new buyers may induce inefficient outcomes, even in the asymmetric equilibria
of the sequential auction game.
We now demonstrate that the ascending auction does not share the inefficiency of the
second-price auction in this setting. Note that when there are only two bidders present,
the losing bidder is guaranteed a payoff of δvi in the next period. Therefore, bidders are
willing to remain active in an auction until the price reaches (1− δ)vi. Thus, the expected
payoff of a bidder when she has only one opponent present on the market is given by
U(vi, vj) from Equation 3.1.
When there are three bidders present, matters are slightly different. In particular, the
very nature of an ascending auction immediately reveals to all bidders the number of
5The qualitative features of the equilibrium do not depend on these parameter values. Moreover, the result
remains true even if the presence of the new entrant is made common knowledge or contingent bidding is
used. This may be easily seen by examing the bids of buyers 1 and 2 in the cases where q = 0 and q = 1.
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participants. Thus, bidder 3 is unable to keep private her presence on the market. This
implies that the first bidder to drop out of the auction knows that they have the lowest
value among three bidders, and hence will receive an expected payoff of δ2vi. Thus, each
of the three bidders remains active until the price reaches
(1− δ2)vi.
Denoting by vˆ3 the lowest of the three values, the two remaining bidders now know that
they are guaranteed a payoff of U(vi, vˆ3) in the following period, and are hence willing to
remain active until they are indifferent between winning at the current price and winning
the object in the following period; that is, until the price reaches
(1− δ)vi + δ(1− δ)vˆ3.
Notice that these cutoff prices are strictly increasing in each bidder’s value, and hence are
both efficient and fully revealing.6 Thus, we have established that the ascending auction
does not suffer from the same shortcomings as the second-price auction in this relatively
simple setting. We will therefore focus exclusively on the ascending auction from this
point forward.
4. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
4.1. Preliminaries and Equilibrium Strategies. One of the most remarkable features of
the equilibrium that we construct in this model is that buyer’s bids and payoffs do not
depend upon the valuations of higher-ranked bidders (neither in expectation nor realiza-
tion), even if that information is publicly available. Recall that vˆ is the ordered vector of
realized buyer valuations, where
vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn,
and that we denote by Vk,n(vˆ) the expected payoff of the buyer with the k-th highest of
n values. To show the property described above, we will show that (abusing notation
slightly) we may write
Vk,n(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = Vk,n(vˆk, . . . , vˆn).
A formal statement of this result may be found in the subsequent section; in the meantime,
we will describe the equilibrium taking this property as a given.
Suppose that an auction is in progress with n bidders with (ordered) values vˆ. When all
bidders are still active, a bidder with valuation vi who drops out of the bidding learns (and
reveals) that, in equilibrium, she has the lowest value; that is, that vˆn = vi. Therefore, her
expected payoff in the next period is Vn−1,n−1(vi), as at the beginning of the next period,
6In addition, it is straightforward to verify that these strategies do, in fact, constitute an equilibrium. Con-
ditional on participation, no bidder wishes to deviate from these strategies. Furthermore, no bidder wishes
to postpone their participation to a future period.
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there will be n − 1 bidders remaining (the current periods n bidders less the winning
buyer) and she will have the lowest value. Therefore, each bidder i should remain in the
auction until the current price p is such that
vi − p = δVn−1,n−1(vi).
At this price, bidder i is indifferent between purchasing the object today and waiting until
the next period when i will be the lowest-valued buyer. Thus, when no one has dropped
out, bidder i will remain in the auction until the price reaches
(4.1) βn,n(vi) := vi − δVn−1,n−1(vi).
Once someone drops out of the auction, the remaining n−1 bidders learn the realization
of vˆn and that they are not the lowest-valued competitor.7 Therefore, the next bidder (with
value vj) to drop out reveals herself to be the second-lowest of the n bidders; therefore,
her expected payoff in the next period is Vn−2,n−1(vj, vˆn), as she will be the second-lowest
of the n − 1 buyers remaining in the following period. Thus, each bidder j who has not
already dropped out should remain in the auction until the current price p is such that
she is indifferent between purchasing the object in the present period and waiting until
the next period—that is, when
vj − p = δVn−2,n−1(vj, vˆn).
Thus, when no one has dropped out, bidder j remains in the auction until the price
reaches
(4.2) βn−1,n(vi, vˆn) := vi − δVn−2,n−1(vi, vˆn).
Proceeding inductively, we define for each k = 2, . . . , n the bidding function
(4.3) βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) := vi − δVk−1,n−1(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn).
These bidding functions define the drop-out points for a bidder with value vi when there
are k buyers still active in the auction. Notice that this implies that the final price in this
auction will be
β2,n(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn) = vˆ2 − δV1,n−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn).
Keep in mind, however, that we must verify that these bid functions are invertible (so that
values are revealed), and also that these bidding strategies indeed form an equilibrium.
This requires a characterization of the expected payoff functions Vk,n.
4.2. The Payoff Functions. As a preview of our results, consider first the case of a lone
buyer present on the market at the beginning of a period with valuation v1, and that
7This of course requires βn,n to be invertible, something that we will verify in short order.
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a second buyer may arrive with probability q. Once the price clock starts rising, it is
immediately revealed whether there are one or two bidders present. Thus, there is no
asymmetric information regarding the number of active bidders.
Note that if the second bidder does not arrive, the lone bidder receives the object for
free. In the case of two bidders present, however, each bidder i = 1, 2 will stay in the
auction until the price rises to β2,2(vi) = vi − δV1,1(vi). Thus,
V1,1(v1) = (1− q)v1 + q
[∫ v1
0
(v1 − β2,2(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
v1
δV1,1(v1) dF (v
′)
]
.
The first term in this expression is bidder 1’s payoff if she is alone on the market. The sec-
ond term is her expected payoff if a second bidder arrives, and is the sum of her expected
winnings if the second bidder has a lower value than her and her expected continuation
payoff if she loses the auction. Differentiation of this expression with respect to v1 and
then substituting for β2,2(v1) yields
V ′1,1(v1) = (1− q) + q (f(v1)v1 + F (v1)− f(v1)β2,2(v1))
− δq ((1− F (v1))V ′1,1(v1)− f(v1)V1,1(v1))
=
1− q(1− F (v1))
1− δq(1− F (v1)) .
Note that we may rewrite this expression as
∞∑
t=0
(δq(1− F (v1)))t [1− q(1− F (v1))],
which is the summation of the expected per-period gain from a marginal increase in v1,
discounted by the probability of that gain being realized in any given period.
Furthermore, note that V1,1(0) = 0, implying that
(4.4) V1,1(vi) = V1,1(0) +
∫ vi
0
V ′1,1(v
′) dv′ =
∫ vi
0
1− q(1− F (v′))
1− δq(1− F (v′)) dv
′.
Note that 0 < V ′1,1(v′) < 1 for all v′ ∈ R+. Hence, V1,1 is strictly increasing, as is β2,2.
We will now proceed to characterize Vk,n inductively for all k ∈ N and all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}
via a series of propositions.
PROPOSITION 1 (Existence and uniqueness of Vk,n).
Fix any n > 1, and suppose that the expected payoff to a buyer when a period starts with n − 1
bidders present depends only on the rank of that bidder and the values of those with values lower
than her; that is, given (known) values vˆ ∈ Rn−1+ , the k-th highest of the n − 1 bidders receives
expected payoff Vk,n−1(vˆk, . . . , vˆn−1). Then the expected payoff of the k-th highest of n bidders,
for all k = 1, . . . , n, is given by Vk,n(vˆk, . . . , vˆn). Furthermore, given {Vk,n−1}n−1k=1 , the functions
{Vk,n}nk=1 are uniquely determined.
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Proof. The proof may be found in Appendix A.
Thus, the strategies in Equation 4.3 lead to well-defined and unique value functions
for the buyers. In addition, following these strategies implies that these expected payoffs
are not dependent upon history—they do not depend upon the values or prices paid in
previous periods—but rather depend only upon the values of those buyers ranked below
a bidder.
We may also use the indifference inherent in the definition of our conjectured equi-
librium strategy in order to illustrate the link between the various payoff functions. In
particular, we have the following
PROPOSITION 2 (Relationship between Vk,n and V1,n).
Fix any n ∈ N. Then for all k = 1, . . . , n, the expected payoff to the k-th ranked of n buyer is equal
to that of the highest-ranked buyer when she is tied with k − 1 of her opponents; that is,
Vk,n(vˆk, . . . , vˆn) = V1,n(vˆk, . . . , vˆk, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn).
Proof. The proof may be found in Appendix A.
As mentioned above, this result makes heavy use of the indifference conditions built
into the bidding strategies described in Equation 4.3, and in particular the indifference of
the buyer with the second-highest value. This bidder drops out at a price at which she is
indifferent between winning immediately or waiting one period. Unsurprisingly, when
the top two buyers have the same value, they must receive the same payoff, regardless
of the tie-breaking rule used to determine which one of the two should receive the ob-
ject when they drop out simultaneously. The intuition behind the relationship between
lower-ranked buyers’ payoff functions is analogous. Moreover, Proposition 2 implies that
knowledge of the functions {V1,n}∞n=1 is sufficient to determine the remaining value func-
tions. Thus, define the function λ : R+ → [0, 1] by
(4.5) λ(v) := δ
1− q(1− F (v))
1− δq(1− F (v)) .
We have the following
THEOREM 1 (Characterization of Vk,n).
For all n ∈ N and all k = 1, . . . , n,
(4.6) Vk,n(vˆ) = δ−1
n∑
j=k
∫ vˆj
vˆj+1
λj(v′) dv′,
where we take vˆn+1 := 1.
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Proof. Note that we may write V1,n(vˆ) as
V1,n(vˆ) = (1− q) [vˆ1 − β2,n(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn)]
+ q
[
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
(
vˆ1 − β2,n+1(ˆˆv−1(v′))
)
dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δV1,n(vˆ) dF (v
′)
]
,
(4.7)
where ˆˆv(v′) is the ordered vector that arises from adding v′ to vˆ. We will denote by V (j)1,n
the partial derivative of V1,n with respect to its j-th argument. Differentiation with respect
to vˆ1 then implies that
V
(1)
1,n (vˆ) = 1− q(1− F (vˆ1)) + δq(1− F (vˆ1))V (1)1,n (vˆ) = δ−1λ(vˆ1).
Notice that this result is independent of n. Furthermore, note that this implies that V (j)1,n (vˆ)
does not depend on vˆ1 for any j 6= 1; equivalently, for all n ∈ N,
V
(1,j)
1,n (vˆ) = 0 for all vˆ ∈ Rn+ and j 6= 1.
Differentiating Equation 4.7 with respect to vˆ2 now leads to
V
(2)
1,n (vˆ) = − (1− q(1− F (vˆ2)) + δ(1− q)V (1)1,n−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn) + δq(1− F (vˆ1))V (2)1,n (vˆ)
+ δq
n−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
V
(1)
1,n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) + δq
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
V
(2)
1,n (v
′, vˆ2, . . . , vˆn) dF (v′).
Note first that ∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
V
(2)
1,n (v
′, vˆ2, . . . , vˆn) dF (v′) = (F (vˆ1)− F (vˆ2))V (2)1,n (vˆ)
since V (1,2)1,n = 0. Moreover,
n−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
V
(1)
1,n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) =
∫ vˆ2
0
δ−1λ(vˆ2) dF (v′) = δ−1λ(vˆ2)F (vˆ2).
Thus, we have
V
(2)
1,n (vˆ) =
− (1− q(1− F (vˆ2))) + (1− q(1− F (vˆ2)))λ(vˆ2)
1− δq(1− F (vˆ2))
=
1− q(1− F (vˆ2))
1− δq(1− F (vˆ2)) (λ(vˆ2)− 1) = δ
−1 (λ2(vˆ2)− λ(vˆ2)) .
Note that, similar to the case of V (1)1,n , V
(2)
1,n depends only on the second argument of V1,n.
Thus, for all n ∈ N,
V
(2,j)
1,n (vˆ) = 0 for all vˆ ∈ Rn+ and j 6= 2.
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Proceeding inductively, fix any k ∈ {3, . . . , n} for arbitrary n ∈ N, and suppose that
V
(j)
1,n (vˆ) = δ
−1 (λj(vˆj)− λj−1(vˆj))
for all j = 2, . . . , k − 1. Differentiating Equation 4.7 with respect to vˆk yields
V
(k)
1,n (vˆ) = δ(1− q)V (k−1)1,n−1 (vˆ2, . . . , vˆn) + δq
n−k∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
V
(k−1)
1,n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+ δq
n−1∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
V
(k)
1,n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) + δq(1− F (vˆ1))V (k)1,n (vˆ).
Since V (k−1)1,n does not depend on any of its arguments but the (k − 1)-th,
n−k∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
V
(k−1)
1,n (
ˆˆv−1(v′) dF (v′) = F (vˆk)V
(k−1)
1,n−1 (vˆ−1).
In addition, V (j,k)1,n = 0 for all j < k implies that
n−1∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
V
(k)
1,n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) = (F (vˆ1)− F (vˆk))V (k)1,n (vˆ).
Thus, we have
V
(k)
1,n (vˆ) = δ(1− q)V (k−1)1,n−1 (vˆ−1) + δqF (vˆk)V (k−1)1,n−1 (vˆ−1) + δq(1− F (vˆk))V (k)1,n (vˆ)
= δ
1− q(1− F (vˆk))
1− δq(1− F (vˆk))V
(k−1)
1,n−1 (vˆ−1) = δ
−1 (λk(vˆk)− λk−1(vˆk)) .
By induction, the above expression holds for all k = 2, . . . , n, where n ∈ N is arbitrary.
We may then apply the boundary condition V1,n(0, . . . , 0) = 0 in order to show that
V1,n(vˆ) = V1,n(0, . . . , 0) +
n∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
V
(j)
1,n (v
′) dv′j = δ
−1
n∑
j=1
[∫ vˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′ −
∫ vˆj+1
0
λj(v′) dv′
]
,
where we take vˆn+1 := 0. Applying Proposition 2 and some arithmetic manipulation to
the above expression then yields the desired result that
(4.8) Vk,n(vˆ) = δ−1
n∑
j=k
[∫ vˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′ −
∫ vˆj+1
0
λj(v′) dv′
]
.
To better understand this result, let us consider two “corner” cases. In particular, notice
that if q = 0 (that is, if no new buyers ever arrive on the market), then
Vk,n(vˆ) =
n∑
j=l
δj−1(vˆj − vˆj+1) for all k = 1, . . . , n and any n ∈ N.
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Thus, the expected payoff to a buyer in this case is the discounted difference between
consecutively ranked valuations. Note that this is also exactly the externality imposed
by the k-th highest buyer on all those ranked below her when there is no entry, as she
postpones each one’s receipt of an object by exactly one period. On the other hand, if
δ = 1 and buyers are “infinitely patient,” then for any q, we have
Vk,n(vˆ) = vˆk for all k = 1, . . . , n and any n ∈ N.
In this case, buyers care only about their eventual receipt of an object, but not about
the timing of that event. Therefore, their bids are all equal to zero, and any random
assignment of objects leaves the buyers equally well off.
4.3. Equilibrium. With the characterization derived in Theorem 1, we may now refor-
mulate the bidding strategies from Equation 4.3 as
(4.9) βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) = vi −
∫ vi
vˆk+1
λk−1(v′) dv′ −
n∑
j=k+1
∫ vˆj
vˆj+1
λj−1(v′) dv′.
This expression allows us to demonstrate the properties of bids in the following
PROPOSITION 3 (Information revelation and sequential consistency of βl,k).
The buyers’ bids βk,n, where n ∈ N and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are strictly increasing in each buyers’ own
valuation. Furthermore, when the buyers use these bidding functions, the exit of a lower-ranked
bidder does not induce the immediate exit of any higher-ranked bidders.
Proof. The proof may be found in Appendix A.
Note that this proposition verifies our previous assumption that buyers’ values are re-
vealed after each round—since the bidding functions are strictly increasing in each buy-
ers’ own private valuation, the price at which they drop out of the auction is an invertible
function, thereby allowing the inference of their value by their competitors. Further-
more, since the bidding functions are “sequentially consistent,” a higher-ranked bidder
remains in the auction instead of immediately exiting after a lower-ranked bidder drops
out, thereby allowing the other buyers to (eventually) deduce their value.
Finally, it remains to be shown that the bidding strategies described are, in fact, an
equilibrium of this model. We demonstrate this in the following
THEOREM 2 (Equilibrium verification).
Suppose that in each period, buyers bid according to the cutoff strategies given in Equation 4.9.
This strategy profile forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential auction game.
Proof. Consider any period with n ∈ N buyers on the market, and fix an arbitrary bidder
i. Suppose that all bidders other than i are using the conjectured strategy. We must show
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that bidder i has no incentive to make a one-shot deviation from the collection of bidding
functions {βk,n}nk=2.
Note first that if vi < vˆ1, dropping out of the auction early has no bearing on expected
future payoffs due to the memorylessness of the bidding strategies—in each period, the
process of information revelation is repeated, and hence a one-shot deviation to an early
exit will not affect the bidding behavior in future periods. On the other hand, suppose that
vi = vˆ1; that is, bidder i has the highest realized valuation among those bidders present
on the market. Following the conjectured equilibrium leads to a payoff of vˆ1 − β2,n(vˆ−1),
while deviating and exiting at a lower price leads to the second-ranked bidder winning
and a payoff to i of δV1,n−1(vˆ−2). Letting wˆ := (vˆ3, . . . , vˆn), we then have
vˆ1 − β2,n(vˆ2, wˆ)− δV1,n−1(vˆ1, wˆ) = vˆ1 − vˆ2 + δ (V1,n−1(v2, wˆ)− V1,n−1(v1, wˆ))
= vˆ1 − vˆ2 +
(∫ vˆ2
0
λ(v′) dv′ −
∫ vˆ1
0
λ(v′) dv′
)
=
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
(1− λ(v′)) dv′ ≥ 0
since vˆ1 > vˆ2 and 0 ≤ λ(v′) ≤ 1 for all v′ ∈ R+. Thus, deviating and exiting the auction
early leads to a strict decrease in utility if the realized values are such that bidder i has
the highest value, and does not affect payoffs otherwise.
On the other hand, bidder i also has the option of remaining active beyond the cutoffs
specified in the conjectured equilibrium. If the realized values are such that vi = vˆ1,
delaying exit will have no effect, as the other bidders will have already dropped out of the
auction earlier than i. If, on the other hand, vi = vˆk for some k > 1, then delaying exit may
have an effect on i’s payoffs. To be precise, if i exits before the eventual winner, her payoff
will remain unchanged as behavior in future periods does not depend upon information
already revealed. Thus, in order to influence her payoff, imust win the auction, remaining
present in the auction until all other bidders have dropped out. Winning the auction
yields a payoff of vˆk − β2,n(vˆ−k), while following the strategy in Equation 4.9 leads to an
expected payoff of δVk−1,n−1. Letting wˆ := (vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn), we have
vˆk − β2,n(vˆ−k)− δVk−1,n−1(vˆk, wˆ) = vˆk − vˆ1 + δ (V1,n−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆk−1, wˆ)− Vk−1,n−1(vˆk, wˆ))
= vˆk − vˆ1 +
k−1∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
vˆj+1
λj(v′) dv′
≤ vˆk − vˆ1 +
k−1∑
j=1
(vˆj − vˆj+1) = 0,
where the second line follows from from Theorem 1, and the third from the fact that 0 ≤
λ(v′) ≤ 1 for all v′ ∈ R+. Hence, deviating and exiting the auction later than prescribed
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has no effect if i has the highest value, but may leads to a decrease in utility if the realized
values are such that vi < vˆ1.
Thus, we may conclude that bidder i has no incentive to make a one-shot deviation
from the collection of bidding functions {βk,n}nk=2 regardless of the realized values. Fur-
thermore, the choice of n throughout was arbitrary, implying that bidding according to
Equation 4.9 is optimal along the equilibrium path.
In order to determine optimality off the equilibrium path, we need to consider the be-
havior of bidders after a deviation. We have already shown, however, that deviations
will be zero probability events, and hence we are free to choose arbitrary off-equilibrium
beliefs—Bayes’ rule has no bite in this situation. In particular, we will suppose that after a
deviation, buyers ignore the history of the game and believe that the deviator is currently
truthfully revealing her value in accordance with the bidding functions {βk,n}nk=2. The
arguments used above therefore imply that continuing to bid according to this strategy
remains optimal for all agents, including any that may have deviated in the current or
previous periods. Thus, bidding according to {βk,n}nk=2 as defined in Equation 4.9 is op-
timal along the entirety of the game tree, and hence is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
the sequential auction game.
One should note that this equilibrium is by no means unique, especially given the mul-
tiplicity of equilibria possible in a one-shot auction game. In particular, the results of
Bikhchandani, Haile, and Riley (2002) may be applied in this setting to show that there
exists a continuum of symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria with full information revela-
tion in every period. These equilibria, however, are all characterized by identical bidding
behavior when there are only two active buyers remaining in any period—the values of
lower-ranked bidders may be revealed in a variety of ways, but this information is used
identically across all equilibria of this kind. Thus, we have payoff and outcome equiva-
lence across all symmetric separating equilibria of this game.
5. DYNAMIC VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM
Bergemann and Välimäki (2007) develop the dynamic pivotal mechanism (also referred
to as the dynamic marginal contribution or dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism),
a direct mechanism that implements the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic pri-
vate value environment in which agents receive private information over time. In the
mechanism that they propose, agents receive in each period their marginal contribution
to the social welfare in a dynamic generalization of the standard Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
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Mechanism. In this mechanism, the truthtelling strategy is periodic ex post individu-
ally rational and incentive compatible.8 Moreover, the authors show that the sequential
ascending auction yields an identical implementation in the case of a scheduling prob-
lem with a fixed set of independent tasks. Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2007) take the
model one step further, demonstrating that dynamic VCG truthfully implements the so-
cially efficient allocation in more general dynamic settings. In this section, we show that
the equilibrium in the sequential ascending auction discussed above is equivalent to the
truthtelling equilibrium of the dynamic VCG mechanism. In addition, we use the result
of Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2007) to characterize equilibrium in the sequential ascend-
ing auction when objects are no longer available with certainty in every period, and hence
there may be (effectively) multiple new entrants participating in a given auction.
5.1. Constant Availability of Objects. We first consider the model examined above in
which exactly one object is available for sale in every period. In this setting, the socially
efficient policy is to allocate each object to the buyer with the highest valuation present
on the market.9
Let us define W0 to be the expected value to the social planner at the beginning of a
period in which no buyers are present on the market. Then, letting v¯ denote the expected
value of the distribution F , we may write
W0 = q
∫ ∞
0
(v′ + δW0) dF (v′) + (1− q)δW0 = qv¯
1− δ .
Denote by Wn(vˆ) the expected value to the social planner at the beginning of a period
when there are n buyers with values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn, before the realization of the new buyer
arrival process. We may recursively solve for this function; in particular, we have the
following
PROPOSITION 4 (Planner’s payoff function).
The social planner’s expected value at the beginning of a period in which there are n buyers present
on the market with values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn is given by
(5.1) Wn(vˆ) = W0 + δ−1
n∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′.
8In dynamic settings with the arrival of new information, the concepts of periodic ex post individual rational-
ity and incentive compatibility are the natural counterparts of ex post individual rationality and incentive
compatibility, as they account for the possibility of the arrival of additional information in the future.
9Intuitively, since a new object arrives in every period and future entrants’ values are independent of the
current state, there is no benefit to not allocating the object in any particular period. Moreover, allocating
an object to a lower-valued buyer is inefficient due to the fact that the common discount factor δ is smaller
than one; therefore, postponing a higher-valued buyer for the benefit of a lower-valued one is costly. A
more formal exposition of this argument may be found in Appendix B.
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Proof. The proof, which is similar to that of Theorem 1, may be found in Appendix A.
Effectively, this proposition yields an analogue to the social planner’s payoff in the case
of a fixed number of buyers without any entry. With n buyers whose values are given by
v1 > · · · > vn, the efficient allocation yields a value to the planner given by
∑n
j=1 δ
j−1vj . In
our setting, however, potential entrants can and do rearrange the ordering of agents in the
efficient allocation, postponing the time at which buyers with lower valuations receive
an object. Thus, their contribution to social welfare must take this effect into account.
So, consider the buyer with the highest valuation vˆ1. If we increase his valuation by an
infintesimal amount, the planner gains an equal amount with probability 1−q(1−F (vˆ1)),
the probability that no higher-valued new entrant arrives. On the other hand, with the
complementary probability q(1 − F (vˆ1)), assignment of the object to our buyer (and the
realization of the planner’s gain) is postponed. Thus, the benefit from the increase in vˆ1 is
(1− q(1− F (vˆ1))) + q(1− F (vˆ1))δ [(1− q(1− F (vˆ1))) + q(1− F (vˆ1))δ · · · ]
=
∞∑
m=0
(δq(1− F (vˆ1)))m (1− q(1− F (vˆ1)) = 1− q(1− F (vˆ1))
1− δq(1− F (vˆ1)) = δ
−1λ(vˆ1).
Integrating this ratio therefore captures the total contribution (relative to assigning the
object to a buyer with value 0) of the high-value buyer. Analogous reasoning follows for
the remaining (lower-ranked) buyers.
We may then use this result to provide an interpretation for the buyer payoff functions
characterized in Theorem 1 by relating the expression for buyer payoffs in Equation 4.6 to
the planner’s payoff function given in Equation 5.1. In particular, we have the following
THEOREM 3 (Relationship between V and W ).
For any n ∈ N and any k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the expected payoff of the k-th ranked buyer in the
sequential auction game is equal to her marginal contribution to the social welfare; that is,
(5.2) Vk,n(vˆ) = Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−k).
Proof. The proof proceeds via straightforward arithmetic:
Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−k) =
[
W0 + δ
−1
n∑
j=1
δj−1
∫ vˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′
]
−
[
W0 + δ
−1
k−1∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′ + δ−1
n∑
j=k+1
∫ vˆj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′
]
= δ−1
[
n∑
j=k
∫ vˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′ −
n∑
j=k+1
∫ vˆj
0
λj−1(v′) dv′
]
.
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Rearranging the terms of the summation yields Vk,n(vˆ), as desired.
Thus, the marginal contribution of a buyer, and hence their expected payoff in the equi-
librium of the sequential ascending auction game, is exactly the buyer’s marginal contri-
bution to the social welfare, which is determined by the difference in the scheduling of
object assignments to those bidders who have lower values. Moreover, this demonstrates
the equivalence between the dynamic marginal contribution mechanism and the sequen-
tial ascending auction in this setting. Not only are continuation payoffs identical in the
two settings, but the timing of payments and object allocations are also the same.
5.2. Random Arrival of Objects. We now consider a generalization of the setting of the
previous sections. Instead of a single object arriving with certainty in every period, we
now allow the arrival of objects to be probabilistic. In particular, at most one object arrives
on the market in each period with probability p ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the number of buyers
present on the market may increase between auctions, as it is possible for multiple new
buyers to arrive before another object becomes available for sale.10 Notice that the socially
efficient policy remains unchanged from that of the previous setting—when available,
objects should be allocated to the highest-valued buyer currently on the market.11
Once again, we denote by Wn(vˆ) the expected value to the social planner when there
are n buyers present at the beginning of a period with (ordered) values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn. Wn
must satisfy the relationship given by
Wn(vˆ) = pq
[
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
(vˆ1 + δWn(ˆˆv−1(v′))) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
(v′ + δWn(vˆ)) dF (v′)
]
+ p(1− q) [vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1)] + (1− p)q
[
n∑
j=0
δ
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
Wn+1(ˆˆv(v
′)) dF (v′)
]
(5.3)
+ (1− p)(1− q) [δWn(vˆ)] .
Define µ : R+ → [0, 1] by
(5.4) µ(v) :=
1− δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))]
2δ(1− p)q(1− F (v))
−
√
1− 2δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))] + δ2 (1− p− q(1− F (v)))2
2δ(1− p)q(1− F (v)) .
Analogous to Proposition 4, we may then show the following
10Note that this assumption not only leads to a more general competitive environment amongst buyers, but
also leads to a greater expected delay before the assignment of an object to any given market participant.
11This argument is made explicit in Appendix B.
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PROPOSITION 5 (Planner’s payoffs with random object arrivals).
The social planner’s expected value at the beginning of a period in which there are n buyers present
on the market with values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn and objects arrive randomly is given by
(5.5) Wn(vˆ) = W0 + δ−1
n∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
µj(v′) dv′,
where W0 is a constant equal to the planner’s payoff when no buyers are present on the market.
Proof. The proof may be found in Appendix A.
Thus, as in the case in which objects arrive deterministically in every period, the plan-
ner’s expected payoff is an additively separable sum of contributions from each buyer
present on the market, where the magnitude of each contribution is increasing in both the
buyer’s value and rank amongst her competitors. Although µ is not as straightforward to
interpret as λ (defined in Equation 4.5), it reflects the anticipated marginal benefit from in-
creasing the value of the highest-ranked buyer, taking into account the fact that multiple
new entrants may arrive before the next object arrives and thereby delaying the realiza-
tion of the increase to the social welfare from the increase in vˆ1. 12
Notice that our setting satisfies the conditions discussed by Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh
(2007) for the ex post periodic incentive compatible and truthful implementation of the
socially efficient policy by the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.13 Thus, using
the social planner’s payoffs from Proposition 5, we may construct contingent transfers
such that truthful revelation of private values is ex post periodic incentive compatible in
the sequential auction game. In particular, at every point in time, each buyer receives a
transfer equal to their “flow marginal contribution” in that period. This is defined as the
social welfare excluding the player in question when making the allocation that is efficient
given her existence, less the total welfare of all other players when acting as though the
player in question is not present on the market.
To make this clearer, consider a buyer i with value vi who is present on the market,
and suppose that there are n other buyers present on the market with (ordered) values
vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn. Let us suppose first that vi > vˆ1. Thus, if an object is available, the
efficient policy involves assigning the object to buyer i, yielding her a flow payoff of vi.
Furthermore, i should receive a transfer equal to her marginal contribution to the social
12The expression for µ is (slightly) less unwieldy if we consider the continuous-time limit of this model. If
we set δ = e−r∆, p = ρS∆, and q = ρB∆ and consider the limit as ∆ approaches zero, we have
µ(v)→
r + ρS + ρB(1− F (v))−
√
(r + ρS + ρB(1− F (v)))2 − 4ρSρB(1− F (v))
2ρB(1− F (v)) .
Moreover, note that limp→1 µ(v) = λ(v) for all v ∈ R+.
13In particular, the model satisfies the conditions of their Theorem 6.
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welfare, less the current-period utility she receives; this transfer may be written as
(5.6) (0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Others’ welfare with i
− (vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social welfare excluding i
= −vˆ1 + δ (Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−1)) .
On the other hand, if an object is not available, i cannot be allocated an object in the
current period. Therefore, i receives a flow payoff of zero and a transfer of
(0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Others’ welfare with i
− (0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social welfare excluding i
= 0.
Suppose on the other hand that i does not have the highest value. If an object is avail-
able, she will not receive it; moreover, she will receive a transfer of
(vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Others’ welfare with i
− (vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social welfare excluding i
= 0,
as i’s presence does not change the optimal policy. Similarly, if no object is available, i’s
presence, or lack thereof, still does not affect the socially efficient policy. In this case, she
therefore is given a transfer of
(0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Others’ welfare with i
− (0 + δWn(vˆ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Social welfare excluding i
= 0.
In future periods, i (again) receives no transfers until she is eventually the highest-ranked
buyer, as her flow marginal contribution remains zero until that point.
Thus, a buyer’s expected continuation payoff at every point in time in this dynamic
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is given by her marginal contribution to the social
welfare. We may therefore construct an equilibrium of the sequential auction game by
appropriately choosing bidding functions that yield continuation payoffs equal to those
in the direct mechanism.
In particular, we will (abusing notation slightly) let Vk,n denote the expected payoff to
a buyer with the k-th highest of the n values present at the beginning of a period, where
(5.7) Vk,n(vˆ) := Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−k) = δ−1
n∑
j=k
∫ vˆj
vˆj+1
µj(v′) dv′.
Similarly, denoting by βk,n the drop-out point of a bidder with value vi when there are k
active bidders in an auction with n buyers, define
(5.8) βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) := vi − δVk−1,n−1(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn),
where, as before, vˆj for j = k + 1, . . . , n are the revealed values of those bidders that have
already exited the auction. With these definitions in mind, we may prove the following
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THEOREM 4 (Auction equilibrium with random object arrivals).
Suppose that in each period in which an object is available, buyers bid according to the cutoffs
(5.9) βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆk) = vi −
∫ vi
vˆk+1
µk−1(v′) dv′ −
n∑
j=k+1
∫ vˆj
vˆj+1
µj−1(v′) dv′,
where n ∈ N is the number of buyers present on the market, and k ∈ {2, . . . , n} is the number of
active bidders remaining in the current period, and vˆn+1 = 0. Then this strategy profile forms a
fully revealing ex post periodic incentive compatible equilibrium of the sequential auction game.
Proof. Note first that βk,n is strictly increasing in vi for all k and n; in particular, since
µ(v′) ∈ (0, 1) for all v′ ∈ R+,
∂
∂vi
βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) = 1− µk−1(vi) > 0.
Furthermore, notice that
βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn)− βk+1,n(vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn)
= vi − vˆk+1 −
∫ vi
vˆk+1
µk−1(v′) dv′ =
∫ vi
vˆk+1
(
1− µk−1(v′)) dv′,
which is strictly positive whenever vi > vˆk+1. Thus, a lower-ranked bidder’s exit from an
auction does not induce the immediate exit of a higher-ranked bidder, implying that fol-
lowing the bidding strategies in Equation 5.9 is efficient and fully revealing of all private
information.
Note that in the sequential ascending auction game, buyers do not make any payments
unless they win an auction. Moreover, when they do win, they make a payment equal to
the drop-out point of their last remaining opponent in that auction. Following the bidding
strategies defined in Equation 5.9 implies that a bidder with value vi > vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn,
when engaged in an auction, will win the auction and make a payment of
β2,n+1(vˆ) = vˆ1 − δV1,n(vˆ) = vˆ1 − δ (Wn(vˆ)−Wn−1(vˆ−1)) ,
where the second equality comes from the definition of Vk,n in Equation 5.7. Notice that
this payment is exactly the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves transfer described in Equa-
tion 5.6. Thus, following the bidding strategies of Equation 5.9 yields exactly the payoffs
of truthful reporting in the direct mechanism.
Finally, suppose that some arbitrary player i with value vi has an incentive to deviate
from the bidding strategy. Since the cutoff bids are fully revealing, this is equivalent to
i bidding as though her value were v′i 6= vi. Since the bidding strategies yield the same
payoffs as the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, this is equivalent to player i
having an incentive to misreport her type to the social planner in the direct mechanism.
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However, this contradicts the ex post periodic incentive compatibility of truthtelling in
the direct mechanism. Thus, no player has an incentive to deviate.
Not only does Theorem 4 characterize an efficient, fully revealing, and symmetric equi-
librium of the sequential ascending auction game, it also generalizes the equivalence re-
sult of the previous subsection; in a setting with random arrivals of both buyers and ob-
jects, the sequential ascending auction serves as a straightforward and intuitive indirect
mechanism that is equivalent to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.14
6. DISCUSSION
This paper solves for an equilibrium in a model of online auctions. In particular, we
show that in sequential ascending auctions, objects are allocated efficiently in a man-
ner that employs the truthful revelation of private information. Moreover, the bidding
strategy employed by buyers in this equilibrium has the striking property of being ro-
bust to the random entry of new buyers whose valuations are private information—in
each period, all private information is revealed anew, and hence there is no incentive for
new entrants to attempt to manipulate the outcome of future periods by altering the in-
formation that they (truthfully) reveal upon their entry. Furthermore, we show that the
sequential ascending auction in this setting is equivalent to the dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism developed and characterized by Bergemann and Välimäki (2007) and
Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2007). It should be pointed out, however, that in this indi-
rect mechanism, the burden of sophistication and information processing is shifted from
a social planner or mechanism designer to the buyers. While in some settings this may be
problematic, in dynamic marketplaces with a variety of buyers and sellers, it may in fact
be desirable.
There are several interesting avenues for future research in this area. For example, it
would be desirable to have a fully developed model of seller behavior and competition
in “overlapping” auctions, perhaps applying some of the insights of Peters and Severi-
nov (2006) in a setting with multiple simultaneously running auctions. Such a setting
also allows for the introduction and study of endogenous arrival and entry deterrence in
a manner similar to Nekipelov (2007) but while accounting for the endogenously deter-
mined option value of participating in future auctions.
Another important question regards the usefulness of sequential ascending auctions
as an indirect mechanism that implements socially efficient policies when agents are not
14Notice that we have constructed equilibrium strategies in the sequential auction game by using the pay-
offs of the dynamic marginal contribution mechanism. A simple adaptation of this argument may serve as
an alternate proof of Theorem 2.
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constrained to have single-unit demand. Bergemann and Välimäki (2007) provide an ex-
ample that demonstrates the failure of the sequential ascending auction in implementing
the efficient policy in one such setting; it would be useful to understand how this exam-
ple may be generalized so as to better understand when indirect implementation via an
auction mechanism is possible. These questions are, however, left for future work.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
In order to prove Proposition 1, we will make repeated use of the following result re-
garding closed subsets of C(Rn+), the set of continuous real-valued functions on Rn+ en-
dowed with the sup-metric topology. Furthermore, for any k < n, let Ck(Rn+) ⊆ C(Rn+)
denote the subset of such functions that do not depend on their first k arguments. We
have the following
LEMMA 1 (Ck(Rn+) is closed).
For any k ≤ n, Ck(Rn+) is a closed in C(Rn+).
Proof. Fix any convergent sequence {fm}∞m=1 in Ck(Rn+), and let f ∗ ∈ C(Rn+) denote the
limit of this sequence. Suppose that there exist distinct x, y ∈ Rn+ such that xi = yi for
i = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n, but
 := |f ∗(x)− f ∗(y)| > 0.
Since uniform convergence implies point-wise convergence and fm converges to f ∗,
there exists Mx ∈ N such that |fm(x) − f ∗(x)| < 2 for all m > Mx. SImilarly, there exists
My ∈ N such that |fm(y)−f ∗(y)| < 2 for allm > My. Therefore, for anym > max{Mx,My},
 = |f ∗(x)− f ∗(y)| ≤ |f ∗(x)− fm(x)|+ |fm(x)− fm(y)|+ |fm(y)− f ∗(y)|
<

2
+ 0 +

2
= ,
a contradiction. The first inequality above follows from the triangle inequality, and the
second is due to the fact that fm ∈ Ck(Rn+) implies fm(x) = fm(y). Thus, we must have
f ∗(x) = f ∗(y); that is, f ∗ ∈ Ck(Rn+).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let vˆ ∈ Rn+ denote the ordered vector of values of those bidders
present at the beginning of the period, and suppose that they are commonly known. Fur-
thermore, suppose that all buyers use the bidding strategies described in Equation 4.3. If
there are no entrants, then the highest-valued buyer (without loss of generality, bidder 1)
wins the object, and pays the price
β2,n(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn) = vˆ2 − δV1,n−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn).
On the other hand, if a new entrant enters with value v′, bidder 1 may no longer win
the object. Furthermore, even if she does win, the price she pays will depend upon the
realization of v′. In particular, we may write the expected payoff of bidder 1 as
V1,n(vˆ) = (1− q) [vˆ1 − β2,n(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn)]
+ q
[
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
(
vˆ1 − β2,n+1(ˆˆv−1(v′))
)
dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δV1,n(vˆ) dF (v
′)
]
,
(A.1)
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where ˆˆv(v′) is the ordered vector of values including the new entrant, and we define
vˆn+1 := 0. The first term (multiplied by 1−q) is bidder 1’s payoff when no entrant arrives,
while the second term is the (probability-weighted) sum of the payoffs for each possible
realized ranking of the new entrant.
Substituting the definition of β2,n and β2,n+1 from Equation 4.3 and simplifying, we see
that V1,n is given by the fixed point of the operator T1,n : C(Rn+)→ C(Rn+) defined by
[T1,n(W )](vˆ) := (1− q) [vˆ1 − vˆ2 + δV1,n−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn))]
+ q
[∫ vˆ1
0
vˆ1 dF (v
′)−
∫ vˆ2
0
vˆ2 dF (v
′)−
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
v′ dF (v′)
+ δ
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δW (vˆ) dF (v′)
]
.
(A.2)
Fix any W,W ′ ∈ C(Rn+) such that W ≥ W ′. Then
[T1,n(W )− T1,n(W ′)](vˆ) = δq
[ ∑n−1
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
[W −W ′](ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+(1− F (vˆ1))[W −W ′](vˆ)
]
≥ 0.
In addition, for any W ∈ C(Rn+) and any α ∈ R++,
[T1,n(W + α)](vˆ) = [T1,n(W )](vˆ) + δqα.
Thus, T1,n satisfies the monotonicity and discounting conditions of Blackwell’s Contrac-
tion Lemma, and hence we may apply the Banach Fixed Point Theorem to show that V1,n
is the unique fixed point of T1,n.
Now consider V2,n. Suppose (again without loss of generality) that bidder 1 has the
second-highest of the n values; that is, that v1 = vˆ2. If there are no new entrants, then
bidder 1 loses the auction, but has the highest value in the next period. On the other
hand, if a new entrant arrives, bidder 1 will still lose the auction. However, in the next
period, her ranking depends on the realization of the new entrant’s value. Thus, we may
write her payoff as the fixed point of the operator T2,n : C(Rn+)→ C(Rn+) defined by
[T2,n(W )](vˆ) := δ(1− q)V1,n−1(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn) + q
[
n−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
δV1,n(ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
δW (ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δW (vˆ) dF (v′)
]
.
(A.3)
Applying exactly the same technique and steps as with T1,n, we see that T2,n is a contrac-
tion mapping on C(Rn+). Notice that T2,n in fact maps elements of C1(Rn+) into C1(Rn+)
itself; thus, applying Lemma 1, the unique fixed point of T2,n does not depend upon
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its first argument. We may therefore, with a slight abuse of notation, write V2,n(vˆ) =
V2,n(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn).
Now consider any arbitrary k such that 1 < k ≤ n, and suppose that Vk−1,n ∈ Ck−2(Rn+).
Then Vk,n is given by a fixed point of the operator Tk,n : C(Rn+) → C(Rn+), where Tk,n is
defined by
[Tk,n(W )](vˆ) := δ(1− q)Vk−1,n−1(vˆk, . . . , vˆn) + q
[
n−k∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
δVk−1,n(ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+
n−1∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
δW (ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δW (vˆ) dF (v′)
]
.
(A.4)
We may again apply Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point The-
orem to show that Vk,n is the unique fixed point of Tk,n. Furthermore, it is straightfor-
ward to show that Tk,n maps elements ofCk−1(Rn+) intoCk−1(Rn+). Therefore, again using
Lemma 1, we may write Vk,n(vˆ) = Vk,n(vˆk, . . . , vˆn).
Thus, by induction, the bidding strategies in Equation 4.3 lead to unique value func-
tions Vk,n such that, for all n and all k = 1, . . . , n, Vk,n ∈ Ck−1(Rn+).
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall from Equation A.2 in the proof of Proposition 1 that V1,n is
defined as the unique fixed point of T1,n. Letting wˆ := vˆ−1 = (vˆ2, vˆ3, . . . , vˆn), we have
V1,n(vˆ2, wˆ) = [T1,n(V1,n)](vˆ2, wˆ) = δ(1− q)V1,n−1(wˆ)
+ δq
[
n−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
V1,n( ˆˆw(v
′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ2
δV1,n(wˆ) dF (v
′)
]
.
However, this is identical to the definition of T2,n given in Equation A.3, implying that,
for all n ∈ N,
V2,n(wˆ) = V1,n(vˆ2, wˆ).
Fix k > 1, and suppose that Vk,n(vˆk, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) = Vk−1,n(vˆk, vˆk, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) for all
n ≥ k. Redefine wˆ := (vˆk+1, vˆk+2, . . . , vˆn), and consider Vk,n(vˆk+1, wˆ). Recalling from Equa-
tion A.4 the definition of Tk,n, we have
Vk,n(vˆk+1, wˆ) = [Tk,n(Vk,n)](vˆk+1, wˆ) = δ(1− q)Vk−1,n−1(wˆ)
+ q
[
n−k∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
δVk−1,n( ˆˆw(v′)) dF (v′)
+
n−1∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
δVk,n( ˆˆw(v
′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
δVk,n(wˆ) dF (v
′)
]
.
INFORMATION REVELATION AND RANDOM ENTRY IN SEQUENTIAL ASCENDING AUCTIONS 29
Taking into account the fact that the fixed point of this operator lies in Ck(Rn+) allows us
to rewrite the above as
Vk,n(vˆk+1, wˆ) = δ(1−q)Vk,n−1(wˆ)+q
[
n−k−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
δVk,n( ˆˆw(v
′)) dF (v′)+
∫ ∞
vˆk+1
δVk,n(wˆ) dF (v
′)
]
.
Notice that the above is a reformulation of the expression for Tk+1,n. Since Vk,n(wˆ) is a
fixed point of the operator, the uniqueness result from Proposition 1 implies that
Vk+1,n(wˆ) = Vk,n(vˆk+1, wˆ)
for all n ≥ k + 1. Thus, by induction on k, we have established that, for arbitrary n ∈ N
and for all k = 1, . . . , n,
Vk,n(vˆk, . . . , vˆn) = V1,n(vˆk, . . . , vˆk, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn).
Proof of Proposition 3. To prove the first part of this proposition, it suffices to simply dif-
ferentiate the bid function βk,n with respect to the bidder’s own value vi. In particular, we
have, for all n ∈ N and k = 1, . . . , n,
∂
∂vi
βk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) = 1− λl−1(vi).
However, λ(v) ∈ (0, 1) for all v ∈ R+, and so ∂∂viβk,n(vi, vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) > 0.
As for the second part of this proposition, let wˆ := (vˆk+1, . . . , vˆn) and note that
βk,n(vi, wˆ)− βk+1,n(wˆ) = vi − δVk−1,n−1(vi, wˆ)− vˆk+1 + δVk,n−1(wˆ)
= vi − vˆk+1 − δ (V1,n−1(vi, . . . , vi, wˆ)− V1,n−1(vˆk+1, . . . , vˆk+1, wˆ))
= vi − vˆk+1 −
∫ vi
vˆk+1
λk(v′) dv′ =
∫ vi
vˆk+1
(
1− λk(v′)) dv′.
Since λ(v′) ∈ (0, 1) for all v′ ∈ R+, this expression is positive if, and only if, vi > vˆk+1. Thus,
the exit of a lower-ranked bidder does not induce the immediate exit of a higher-ranked
bidder who is using the bidding strategy given in Equation 4.9.
Proof of Proposition 4. We begin by showing thatW1 has the desired form and then proceed
inductively. Note that W1 is a fixed point of the operator Tˆ1 : C(R+)→ C(R+) defined by
(A.5) [Tˆ (g)](x) := (1− q)(x+ δW0) + q
[∫ x
0
(x+ δg(y)) dF (y) +
∫ ∞
x
(y + δg(x)) dF (y)
]
.
This operator is clearly a self-map from C(R+) into itself. Furthermore, it is straightfor-
ward to see that Tˆ1 is a contraction mapping. Fix any g, g′ ∈ C(R+) such that g′ > g.
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Then
[Tˆ1(g
′ − g)](x) = δq
[∫ x
0
(g′(y)− g(y)) dF (y) + (1− F (x))(g′(x)− g(x))
]
> 0.
Furthermore, for any g ∈ C(R+) and any α ∈ R++,
[Tˆ1(g + α)](x) = [Tˆ1(g)](x) + δqα.
Since δq < 1, we may apply Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point
Theorem, implying that Tˆ1 has a unique fixed point W1 such that
W1(vˆ1) = (1− q)(vˆ1 + δW0) + q
[∫ vˆ
0
(vˆ + δW1(v
′)) dF (v′) +
∫ ∞
vˆ
(v′ + δW1(vˆ)) dF (v′)
]
.
Differentiating this expression with respect to vˆ1 yields
W ′1(vˆ1) = (1− q) + qF (vˆ1) + δq(1− F (vˆ))W ′1(vˆ) = δ−1λ(vˆ1).
Finally, note that W1(0) = W0, since a buyer with value zero adds nothing to the social
welfare. Therefore, by the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we have
(A.6) W1(vˆ1) = W0 + δ−1
∫ vˆ1
0
λ(v′) dv′.
Now consider Wn(vˆ) for arbitrary n > 1, and suppose that Wn−1 takes the desired
form.15 Wn is defined to be a fixed point of the operator Tˆn : C(Rn+)→ C(Rn+) given by
[Tˆn(g)](x) := (1− q)(x1 + δWn−1(x−1))
+ q
[ n−1∑
j=0
∫ xn−j
xn−j+1
(x1 + δg(x2, . . . , xn−j, y, xn−j+1, . . . , xn)) dF (y)
+
∫ ∞
x1
(y + δg(x)) dF (y)
]
.
(A.7)
Note that for any g, g′ ∈ C(Rn+) such that g′ > g, we have
[Tˆn(g
′ − g)](x) = δq
[ n−1∑
j=0
∫ xn−j
xn−j+1
[g′ − g](x2, . . . , xn−j, y, xn−j+1, . . . , xn) dF (y)
+ (1− F (x1)(g′(x)− g(x))
]
> 0.
Furthermore, for any g ∈ C(Rn+) and any α ∈ R++,
[Tˆn(g + α)](x) = [Tˆn(g)](x) + δqα.
Since δq < 1, Blackwell’s monotonicity and discounting conditions are satisfied. Thus,
Blackwell’s Contraction Lemma and the Banach Fixed Point Theorem imply that Tˆn has a
15Notice that this implies that all of the cross-derivatives of Wn−1 are identically zero.
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unique fixed point Wn such that
Wn(vˆ) = (1− q)(vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1))
+ q
[ n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
(vˆ1 + δWn(vˆ2, . . . , vˆn−j, v′, vˆn−j+1, . . . , vˆn)) dF (v′)
+
∫ ∞
vˆ1
(v′ + δWn(vˆ)) dF (v′)
]
.
(A.8)
Differentiating this expression implicitly with respect to vˆ1 yields
W (1)n (vˆ) = (1− q) + qF (vˆ1) + δq(1− F (vˆ1))W (1)n (vˆ) = δ−1λ(vˆ1).
Note that this expression is independent of n and of vˆj for j 6= 1, implying that W (1,j)n is
identically zero for all j 6= 1.
Similarly, implicit differentiation with respect to vˆ2 yields
W (2)n (vˆ) = δ(1− q)W (1)n−1(vˆ−1) + δq
[ n−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (1)n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
+
∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
W (2)n (v
′, vˆ) dF (v′) + (1− F (vˆ1))W (2)n (vˆ)
]
,
where ˆˆv(vˆ) is the re-ordering of vˆ and v′. Since W 1,jn is identically zero,
n−2∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (1)n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) = δ−1λ(vˆ2)F (vˆ2).
Furthermore, W (2,1)n = 0 implies that∫ vˆ1
vˆ2
W (2)n (v
′, vˆ) dF (v′) + (1− F (vˆ1))W (2)n (vˆ) = (1− F (vˆ2))W (2)n (vˆ).
Thus, making use of the fact that W (1)n−1(vˆ−1) = δ−1λ(vˆ2), we may conclude that
(A.9) W (2)n = (1− q)λ(vˆ2) + qF (vˆ2)λ(vˆ2) + δq(1− F (vˆ2))W (2)n (vˆ) = δ−1λ2(vˆ2).
Once again, note that this expression is independent of n and of vˆj for j 6= 2, implying
that W 2,jn is identically zero for all j 6= 2.
Proceeding inductively, consider the derivative ofWn with respect to its k-th argument,
where k ≤ n. We have
W (k)n (vˆ) = (1− q)δW (k−1)n−1 (vˆ−1) + δq
[ n−k∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (k−1)n (ˆˆv−1(v
′)) dF (v′)
+
n−1∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (k)n (
ˆˆv1(v
′)) dF (v′) + (1− F (vˆ1))W (k)n (vˆ)
]
.
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Applying the same simplifications as above and the inductive hypothesis thatW (k−1)n−1 (vˆ−1) =
δ−1λk−1(vˆk), we have
W (k)n (vˆ) = (1− q)W (k−1)n−1 (vˆ−1) + qF (vˆk)W (k−1)n−1 (vˆ−1) + δq(1− F (vˆk))W (k)n (vˆ)
= δ−1λk(vˆk).(A.10)
Finally, note that Wn(0, . . . , 0) = W0 since, as with one agent with value zero, assigning
an object to a “null” agent yields no increase in social welfare. By induction on n, we may
then conclude that, for all n ∈ N and all vˆ ∈ Rn+,
(A.11) Wn(vˆ) = W0 + δ−1
n∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
λj(v′) dv′.
In order to prove Proposition 5, we will need to make use of the following result.
LEMMA 2 (W is Additively Separable).
The social planner’s expected payoff function in the case of random object arrivals is an additively
separable function of the (ordered) values of the the buyers present on the market.
Proof. Recall that the socially optimal policy in this setting is for the planner to assign
an object—whenever it is available—to the highest-valued buyer on the market. Since
the arrival process of new buyers and the realized valuations of these new entrants are
independent of the number of agents present on the market, a marginal increase in the
value of the highest-valued buyer present on the market does not affect the planner’s
expectations of future realized values, nor does it impact the anticipated plan of object
assignments. Therefore, for any values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn > vˆn+1, we must have
∂
∂vˆ1
Wn(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) =
∂
∂vˆ1
Wn+1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn+1).
Similarly, for any k = 2, . . . , n, a marginal increase in vˆk, the value of the k-th highest-
ranked buyer, affects neither future arrivals and valuations nor the planner’s optimal
plan of action. Therefore, we must have
∂
∂vˆk
Wn(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) =
∂
∂vˆk
Wn+1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn+1).
Thus, for any n ∈ N and any k = 1, . . . , n,
(A.12) W (k)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = W
(k)
n+1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn, vˆn+1),
where vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn > vˆn+1.
Now consider any n ∈ N and ordered values vˆ1 > · · · > vˆn. Equation A.12 implies that
W (1)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = W
(1)
n−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−1) = W
(1)
n−2(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−2) = · · · = W (1)1 (vˆ1).
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Therefore, it must be the case that
W
(1,2)
2 (vˆ1, vˆ2) =
∂
∂vˆ2
W
(1)
2 (vˆ1, vˆ2) =
∂
∂vˆ2
W
(1)
1 (vˆ1) = 0.
Straightforward induction therefore yields
W
(1,k)
k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) =
∂
∂vˆk
W
(1)
k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) =
∂
∂vˆk
W
(1)
k−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆk−1) = 0
for all k = 2, . . . , n. Hence, it must be the case that, for any k 6= 1, W (1)k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) is a
function of vˆ1 alone.
Since Equation A.12 implies that
W (2)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = W
(2)
n−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−1) = W
(2)
n−2(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn−2) = · · · = W (2)2 (vˆ1, vˆ2),
we may perform a similar exercise as above. In particular,
W
(2,3)
3 (vˆ1, vˆ2, vˆ3) =
∂
∂vˆ3
W
(2)
3 (vˆ1, vˆ2, vˆ3) =
∂
∂vˆ3
W
(2)
2 (vˆ1, vˆ2) = 0.
The same inductive reasoning again leads to the conclusion that
W
(2,k)
k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) =
∂
∂vˆk
W
(2)
k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) =
∂
∂vˆk
W
(2)
k−1(vˆ1, . . . , vˆk−1) = 0
for all k = 3, . . . , n. Combining this with the fact that W (1)k is independent of its second
argument yields the conclusion that W (2)k (vˆ1, . . . , vˆk) is a function of vˆ2 alone. Proceeding
inductively in this manner, we may conclude that
(A.13) W (j,k)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = 0 for all j 6= k,
where j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Thus, Equation A.13 implies that, for any n ∈ N and any k = 1, . . . , n, we may write
W (k)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = gk,n(vˆk)
for some real-valued function gk,n. Combining this with Equation A.12 immediately im-
plies that
gk,n = gk,m for all m ≥ n.
Therefore, there exists a sequence of real-valued functions {gk}∞k=1 such that
W (k)n (vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = gk(vˆk)
for arbitrary n ∈ N and k = 1, . . . , n . Therefore, applying the Fundamental Theorem of
Calculus allows us to conclude that, Wn is additively separable; in particular,
(A.14) Wn(vˆ1, . . . , vˆn) = Wn(0, . . . , 0) +
n∑
k=1
∫ vˆk
0
gk(v
′) dv′.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Note that we may rewrite Equation 5.3 as
Wn(vˆ) = pq
[
F (vˆ1)vˆ1 +
∫ ∞
vˆ1
v′ dF (v′) + δ
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
Wn(ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′) + δ(1− F (vˆ1))Wn(vˆ)
]
+ p(1− q) [vˆ1 + δWn−1(vˆ−1)] + (1− p)q
[
n∑
j=0
δ
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
Wn+1(ˆˆv(v
′)) dF (v′)
]
+ (1− p)(1− q) [δWn(vˆ)] .
Differentiating this expression with respect to vˆ1 yields
W (1)n (vˆ) = p[1− q(1− F (vˆ1))] + δ[pq(1− F (vˆ1)) + (1− p)(1− q)]W (1)n (vˆ)
+ δ(1− p)q
n−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W
(1)
n+1(
ˆˆv(v′)) dF (v′) + δ(1− p)q
∫ ∞
vˆ1
W
(2)
n+1(v
′, vˆ) dF (v′).
Similarly, differentiating Wn(vˆ) with respect to vˆk for k > 1 yields
W (k)n (vˆ) = δpq
[
n−k−1∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (k−1)n (ˆˆv−1(v
′)) dF (v′) +
n−1∑
j=n−k
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W (k)n (
ˆˆv−1(v′)) dF (v′)
]
+ δpq(1− F (vˆ1))W (k)n (vˆ) + δ(1− p)q
[
n−k∑
j=0
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W
(k)
n+1(
ˆˆv(v′)) dF (v′)
]
+ δ(1− p)q
[
n∑
j=n−k+1
∫ vˆn−j
vˆn−j+1
W
(k+1)
n+1 (
ˆˆv(v′)) dF (v′)
]
+ δp(1− q)W (k−1)n−1 (vˆ−1)
+ δ(1− p)(1− q)W (k)n (vˆ).
Applying Lemma 2 allows us to denote W (m)n (vˆ) by gm(vˆm), where m,n ∈ N and m ≤ n.
Thus, we may rewrite the two expressions above as
g1(v) = δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))] g1(v)
+ δ(1− p)q(1− F (v))g2(v) + p [1− q(1− F (v))] ,
(A.15)
gk(v) = δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))] gk(v)
+ δ(1− p)q(1− F (v))gk+1(v) + δp [1− q(1− F (v))] gk−1(v),
(A.16)
where k > 1. Note, however, that Equation A.16 also holds for k = 1 if we define
g0(v) :=
1
δ
for all v ∈ R+.
Thus, the partial derivatives of Wn are determined by a second-order difference equation.
Defining
ym(v) :=
[
gm+1(v)
gm(v)
]
and A(v) :=
[
a(v) b(v)
1 0
]
,
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where
a(v) :=
1− δ [pq(1− F (v)) + (1− p)(1− q(1− F (v)))]
δ(1− p)q(1− F (v)) and b(v) := −
δp [1− q(1− F (v))]
δ(1− p)q(1− F (v)) ,
we may rewrite this difference equation as the first-order system
ym+1(v) = A(v)ym(v).
Induction immediately yields the solution
(A.17) ym(v) = [A(v)]
m y0(v).
We denote by µ1(v) and µ2(v) the eigenvalues of A(v); in fact, these can be shown to
take the form
µ1(v) =
a(v)−√a2(v) + 4b(v)
2
and µ2(v) =
a(v) +
√
a2(v) + 4b(v)
2
.
Furthermore, since p, q, δ ∈ (0, 1) and F (v) ∈ [0, 1] for all v ∈ R+, (tedious) arithmetic
manipulation yields
µ2(v) > 1 > µ1(v) > 0 for all v ∈ R+.
Finally, note that A(v) is diagonalizable, and, moreover,
[A(v)]m =
1
µ2(v)− µ1(v)
[
µm+12 (v)− µm+11 (v) µm+11 (v)µ2(v)− µ1(v)µm+12 (v)
µm2 (v)− µm1 (v) µm1 (v)µ2(v)− µ1(v)µm2 (v)
]
.
Thus, Equation A.17 may be rewritten as
gm(v) =
1
µ2(v)− µ1(v) [(µ
m
2 (v)− µm1 (v)) g1(v) + (µm1 (v)µ2(v)− µ1(v)µm2 (v)) g0(v)]
=
µm2 (v)
µ2(v)− µ1(v) (g1(v)− µ1(v)g0(v)) +
µm1 (v)
µ2(v)− µ1(v) (µ2(v)g0(v)− g1(v)) .(A.18)
Since µ2(v) > 1, the first term in Equation A.18 is divergent unless
g1(v) = µ1(v)g0(v).
Such a divergence would, of course, be contradictory; the marginal impact of an increase
of the m-th highest value on the social welfare must be bounded above by δm−1, as the
benefit of this increase is not realized for a minimum of m periods. Thus,
(A.19) gm(v) = µm1 (v)g0(v).
Recalling that Wmn (vˆ) = gm(vˆm) and that g0(v) = δ−1, application of Lemma 2 allows us to
conclude that
(A.20) Wn(vˆ) = Wn(0) + δ−1
n∑
j=1
∫ vˆj
0
µj1(v
′) dv′.
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Finally, note that any agent with a “null” value adds nothing to the social welfare, and
hence the planner’s payoff when they are not present is given by Wn(0) = W0, where
W0 = pq
[∫ ∞
0
(v′ + δW0) dF (v′)
]
+ p(1− q) [δW0]
+ (1− p)q
[∫ ∞
0
δW1(v
′) dF (v′)
]
+ (1− p)(1− q) [δW0]
=
q
1− δ
[
p
∫ ∞
0
v′ dF (v′) + (1− p)
∫ ∞
0
(∫ v′′
0
µ1(v
′) dv′
)
dF (v′′)
]
.
In addition, it is easily verified that µ1(v) is, in fact, equal to the definition provided in
Equation 5.4 for µ(v).
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APPENDIX B. THE SOCIALLY EFFICIENT POLICY
In this appendix, we demonstrate that the socially efficient policy in the setting with
random object availability is that which allocates an object to the highest-valued buyer
currently present on the market whenever an object is available.16
B.1. Preliminaries. Denote the state space of the planner’s problem by Ω := Ω1 × Ω2,
where
(B.1) Ω1 := {S ⊂ Z× R+ : |S| <∞} and Ω2 := {0, 1}.
A state ω = (ω1, ω2) is interpreted as follows: buyer i ∈ Z, with value vi ∈ R+, is present
on the market if, and only if, (i, vi) ∈ ω1; and an object is available if, and only if, ω2 = 1.
We will be indexing buyers by their period of arrival, so that buyer t is the buyer who
may arrive in period t.17
Given a state ω, the planner must choose an allocation a ∈ A(ω), where
A(ω) :=
ω1
⋃{}, if ω2 = 1;
{}, if ω2 = 0.
We interpret the allocation a =  as the null action of not allocating an object. Note that
we will abuse notation slightly when a = . When taking a set difference, we will treat
{} as the empty set; that is, S \ {} := S for all S ⊆ Z.
Recall that the arrival processes of both buyers and objects are history independent. In
particular, the seller arrivals are independently and identically distributed according to
Pr
(
ωt+12 = 1
)
:= p = 1− Pr (ωt+12 = 0) for all t.
On the other hand, the buyers available in the next period depends on the current period
allocation. Letting ξt ⊂ Ξ := N× R+ denote the buyer arrival process in period t, we have
ξt :=
{(t, vt)}, with probability q;∅, with probability 1− q,
where vt is drawn independently from the distribution F and is unknown to the planner
until buyer t is present on the market. We may therefore define a state transition function
τ : Ω× A(Ω)× Ξ→ Ω1 by
ωt+11 = τ(ω
t, at, ξt+1) :=
(
ωt1 \ {at}
)⋃
ξt.
16The argument for the case in which objects arrive in every period is subsumed by the present discussion,
and therefore is is not explicitly considered.
17Buyers that are present on the market in the initial period, however, will be denoted by negative indices;
for instance, if 3 buyers are present in period 0, then ω01 = {(−3, v−3), (−2, v−2), (−1, v−1)}.
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We define the initial (period 0) history to be
H0 := {(ω01, ω02)}.
The set of period t ∈ N arrival histories is then recursively defined by
Ht := Ht−1 × (Ξ× Ω2) for all .
The set of all possible histories is then
H :=
∞⋃
t=0
Ht.
We will say that a history h ∈ H precedes a history h′ ∈ H if h is a prefix of h′, and will
denote this by h→ h′.
Note that given a history ht = ((ω01, ω02), (ξ1, ω12), . . . , (ξt, ωτ2 )) and a sequence of feasible
actions at−1 = (a1, a2, . . . , at−1), we may reconstruct the resultant state ωt by repeated ap-
plication of the state transition function τ . We will use the notational shorthand ωˆ(ht, at−1)
for this state. Thus, we may define an allocation policy as a function a : H → A(Ω) such
that, for all t ∈ N and ht = (ht−1, (ξt, ωt2)),
a(ht) ∈ A (ωˆ (ht, at−1(ht−1))) ,
where at−1(ht−1) is the sequence of allocation decisions taken earlier in the policy.
B.2. Planner’s Problem. Given an initial state ω0 = (ω01, ω02), the planner’s problem may
be written as
(B.2) max
{at}∞t=1
{
Eξ
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1ωt2a
t
2
]}
subject to at ∈ A(ωt), ωt+11 = τ(ωt, at, ξt) for all t ∈ N.
PROPOSITION 6 (Socially Efficient Policy).
The policy a∗ which always allocates an object (when available) to the highest-valued buyer present
maximizes the social planner’s objective function.18
Proof. Fix any policy a0 6= a∗ such that a0 yields a the planner a strictly higher payoff than
the policy a∗, and define
(B.3) Hˆ0 := {h ∈ H : a0(h) 6= a∗(h) and a0(h′) = a∗(h′) for all h′ → h} .
Note that Hˆ0 is the set of all histories h such that a∗ and a0 disagree at h but agree on all
its prefixes—it is the set of “first disagreements” between a∗ and a0. Since a0 does strictly
better than a∗, this set must have nonzero measure (with respect to the measure induced
by the arrival process ξ), as otherwise the two policies would agree almost everywhere.
18Thanks are due to Larry Samuelson for suggesting the method of proof used below.
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For each h ∈ Hˆ0, define
(B.4) i0(h) := a∗(h) and I0(h) := {h′ ∈ H : h→ h′ and a0(h′) = i(h)} .
Thus, I0(h) is the set of histories (possibly empty) at which policy a0 eventually allocates
an object to the buyer who had the highest value at h. Letting
Iˆ0 :=
⋃
h∈Hˆ0
I0(h),
we may define, for each h ∈ I0, hˆ0(h) to be the element of Hˆ0 such that hˆ0(h)→ h.
With these definitions in mind, we may define a new allocation policy
(B.5) a1(h) :=

i0(h), if h ∈ Hˆ0;
a0(hˆ0(h)), if h ∈ Iˆ0;
a0(h), otherwise.
Thus, a1 is identical to a0 except that it “swaps” the allocation decisions at histories h ∈ Hˆ0
with those at histories I0(h). Since the value of the agent associated with i0(h) is greater
than that of the agent associated with a0(h) for all h ∈ Hˆ0, this implies that a1 yields the
planner a strictly greater payoff than a0. To see this, consider any v > v′, and t < t′. Since
δ < 1,
(δtv + δt
′
v′)− (δtv′ + δt′v) = (δt − δt′)(v − v′) > 0.
Such a gain is realized for every history in Hˆ0. Since this set has positive measure, it must
be the case that the planner’s payoff increases.
Notice that if a1 yields the planner a payoff less than or equal to that of a∗, transitivity of
the planner’s payoffs leads to a contradiction, implying that there does not exist a policy
a0 such that a0 does strictly better than a∗, and hence that a∗ is optimal. So suppose, on
the other hand, that a1 does provide a strictly higher payoff than a∗. We may then define
(B.6) Hˆ1 := {h ∈ H : a1(h) 6= a∗(h) and a1(h′) = a∗(h′) for all h′ → h} .
Since a1 is better than a∗, Hˆ1 must have nonzero measure. For each h ∈ Hˆ1, define
i1(h) := a
∗(h), I1(h) := {h′ ∈ H : h→ h′ and a1(h′) = i(h)} , and Iˆ1 :=
⋃
h∈Hˆ1
I1(h).
For each h ∈ I1, let hˆ1(h) be the element of Hˆ1 such that hˆ1(h)→ h. Define
(B.7) a2(h) :=

i1(h), if h ∈ Hˆ1;
a1(hˆ1(h)), if h ∈ Iˆ1;
a1(h), otherwise.
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As before, a2 is identical to a1 except that it “swaps” the allocation decisions at histories
h ∈ Hˆ1 with those at histories I1(h), leading to a gain along the path of each history. Such
a gain is realized at every history in Hˆ1, and since this set has positive measure, it must
be the planner realizes a payoff gain by switching from a1 to a2.
If a2 yields the planner a payoff less than or equal to that of a∗, transitivity of the plan-
ner’s payoffs leads to a contradiction, implying that there does not exist a policy a0 such
that a0 does strictly better than a∗, and hence that a∗ is optimal.
Proceeding inductively in this manner, we either arrive at a contradiction or we con-
struct a sequence of policies {at}∞t=1 with strictly increasing payoffs {νt}∞t=1. Note, how-
ever, that for all t ∈ N, each at agrees with a∗ on all histories h ∈ Ht−1. Since δt approaches
zero as t becomes increasingly large, this implies that this
(B.8) lim
t→∞
νt → ν∗,
where ν∗ is the (finite) expected payoff to the planner from following allocation policy a∗.
Moreover, since the sequence {νt}∞t=1 is increasing, this implies that
(B.9) ν∗ ≥ νt for all t ∈ N,
a contradiction. Therefore, we must conclude that there does not exist any policy a0 that
yields the planner strictly higher payoffs than a∗, and hence that a∗ is, in fact, a socially
efficient policy.
Note that at the ex ante stage, other policies may do as well as a∗ in terms of the plan-
ner’s payoffs; however, using the same “swapping” argument as above, one may show
that the set of histories at which such a policy disagrees with a∗ must be of measure zero.
This implies that a∗ is the unique socially efficient policy when starting from any history.
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